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OHIO COURT HOLDS REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST
VALID AS AGAINST THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
Smyth v. Trust Company
172 Ohio St. 489 (1961)
Walter B. Smyth established an inter vivos trust with the Cleveland
Trust Company in 1949 whereby he transferred title to property having
the approximate value of $136,135.37, to be held in trust for the benefit of
his wife for life. By the terms of the agreement, Smyth retained the right
to revoke or amend the trust; to enjoy its entire income during his lifetime;
to consume the principal to the extent necessary for his maintenance, com-
fort, and enjoyment, absolute discretion being vested in the trustee to
determine the amount; and to control administration as to sales or purchases
of securities whenever practical. Smyth died in 1954 leaving to his wife
as sole legatee under his will a probate estate of $2,385. In addition, he
left joint and survivorship bank accounts of $18,826.06 and life insurance
in the sum of $10,551.91, all of which became the property of Mrs. Smyth.
Shortly after his death his widow filed a petition in the Common Pleas Court
of Cuyahoga County alleging that the trust was illusory and void as to her;
that the agreement was not executed in conformity with the Statute of Wills;
that because so much control over the property was retained by the grantor
a mere agency relationship was created which terminated on the death of
Smyth; and that she was therefore entitled to a distributive share of the
property. The common pleas court and the court of appeals found for
petitioner following the Ohio Supreme Court decisions of Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co.1 and Harris v. Harris.2 On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court the
decision of the lower courts was unanimously reversed, and plaintiff was
precluded from taking a distributive share in the decedent's estate.
The question before the court in this case was whether Smyth could
use an inter vivos trust to disinherit his wife when the election statutes
thwart any attempt to do so by will. The first question is whether the trust
is valid under the Statute of Wills. If the transferor retains so much control
over the property that no trust is created for failure to meet the formal
requirements of the Statute of Wills, then the attempt to create a trust is
abortive as to everyone3 and the special question of the spouse's share does
not arise. The courts have in the past been notoriously reluctant to lay
down precise standards for determining when the transferor has reserved
so many powers that the trust is invalid. Although the courts are still
reluctant to articulate precise standards, in recent years they have permitted
the retention of more and more powers. Many states now allow the trans-
feror to retain considerable powers without requiring the instrument of
transfer to be executed in accordance with the Statute of Wills.4 It is fairly
1 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1941).
2 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947).
3 1 Scott, Trusts 56, 56.1, 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
4 Especially, when the trust agreement though not executed in accordance with the
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well settled that retention of a life interest, the power to revoke or modify,
the power to consume the principal, and a limited power to control the
trustee will not invalidate the trust.5 The Ohio courts have been extremely
willing to enunciate precise standards by which to determine the validity
or invalidity of a trust.6 They have been hesitant, however, to recognize as
valid a trust in which the transferor retains some or all of the powers
mentioned above.7
The primary concern in the case under review and in Bolles is not
whether the trust is valid as tested by the Statute of Wills because in both
cases it was expressly stated that the transfers were non-testamentary. In
regard to the rights of a surviving spouse under an election statute, is the
controlling test merely whether the trust is valid under the Statute of Wills?
There are a number of jurisdictions where this appears to be the sole test
in determining whether the spouse may take his elective share from the
trust.8 In these states if the trust is valid under the Statute of Wills, it is
automatically valid as to the surviving spouse and he or she is precluded
from taking a share.
In other jurisdictions, however, the question is answered in the nega-
tive.9 In the New York case of Newman v. Dore,10 where the trust was held
Statute of Wills, is a formal document. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E.2d
126 (1961).
5 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Kelly v. Parker, 181
Ill. 2d 49, 54 N.E.2d 615 (1899); National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass.
457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d
458 (1942). It should be noted that in many of the cases the trust upheld was executed
by a formal document though not in conformity with the Statute of Wills. 1 Scott,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 572. Contra, Burns v. Turnbull, 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d
448 (1943).
6 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 1; Harris v. Harris, supra note 2.
7 In Worthington v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 (1912), the court held
that an attempted transfer, where the settlor retained the income for life and the right
of revocation, was invalid. In 1921 an amendment of Section 8617, General Code, now
Ohio Rev. Code § 1335.01 validated the freely amendable and fully revocable living
trust subject only to the right of creditors of the settior to enforce the revocation in
their behalf; while recognizing the force of this statute in Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins,
121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929), the court, in dicta, frowned upon this type of
trust; in Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 (1938), the
Supreme Court again upheld the trust, but here the revocation could be exercised only
with the consent of the trustee; in Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139 Ohio St. 50, 38 N.E.2d
185 (1941), the court upheld a trust though the transferor retained an extensive control
of the fund through his lifetime. The court upheld as non-testamentary a fully revocable
trust in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 1.
8 Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945); Jones v. Somerville,
78 Miss. 28 So. 940 (1900) ; McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951).
9 Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 I1. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); Schnaken-
bert v. Schnakenbert, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1941); President and Direc-
tors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 179 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Harris v. Harris, supra note 2;
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 1.
10 Newman v. Dore, supra note 9.
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illusory as to the surviving spouse, the test advocated to determine the
validity of the transfer was whether the transferor divested himself of the
ownership of the property in good faith. However, the court did not decide
whether the trust was testamentary or not, but merely assumed without
deciding that except as to the wife the trust would be valid. In holding that
the trust was illusory as to the spouse, the court recognized that the measure
of control retained by the transferor which will invalidate a trust as to a
surviving spouse may be less than is necessary to invalidate it under the
Statute of Wills."1 Even in New York, however, when no power of control
over administrative details is retained by the transferor, the surviving spouse
is barred from a distributive share.' 2
There is a view in other states that even if a trust is non-testamentary,
the spouse's rights may not be defeated by an inter vivos transfer made
with the intent to deprive the spouse of property from which he or she
could not be precluded by will.' 3 Such a transfer is considered fraud upon
the marital rights of the spouse and will be set aside to the extent of the
spouse's elective share.
Still another approach to the problem is that taken by Maryland. Al-
though the earlier cases mention the retention of control theory and the
test of fraud on the marital rights,' 4 the courts have more recently decided
the cases on equitable doctrines without deciding on the validity of the trust
as such. The courts see how much property the surviving spouse owns,
how much she would take under the will irrespective of the trust, and the
value of the trust corpus. If the court believes the spouse has been ade-
quately provided for, the trust is valid as to the spouse; otherwise, it is
invalid to the amount of the elective share.' 5
It is argued in favor of the Statute of Wills test that if the transfer is
valid as between the transferor and the transferee then, a fortiori, it must
also be good as to all third parties concerned. Thus, it is reasoned that it
is logically impossible for a transfer to be valid and invalid at the same time.
On the other hand, it has been said:
When, however, the basis upon which this concept rests is under-
stood, it seems quite logical. That basis is simply a recognition of
the fact that the policy underlying the election statute is stronger
in regard to the degree of divestment of control necessary for the
11 In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 1, the court decided that the trust was
valid under the Statute of Wills, but was invalid as to the surviving spouse where the
right to income and the power to revoke were reserved by the transferor.
12 Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Standord, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 1939).
13 Payne v. Tatum, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930); Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 435,
43 A.2d 157 (1945); Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 32, 100 Atl. 671 (1917); Thayer v.
Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842). This is also the theory taken by the Model Probate Code.
'4 Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 Atl. 744 (1887).
15 ku shaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 475 (1944); Bullen v. Safe Deposit
and Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A.2d 581 (1939); Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank,
152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927); Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94
Ad. 523 (1915).
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validity of an inter vivos transfer than is the policy underlying the
Statute of Wills. This position appears sound, for it is a surviving
spouse alone who cannot be deprived by wills of a share in the
estate of the decedent. 1 6
There may be, however, no such overriding public policy in Ohio in favor
of the surviving spouse.1 7 This is evidenced by the fact that except for the
spouse's year's allowance and mansion house rights, secured creditors, by
statute, come ahead of the surviving spouse in the distribution of a decedent's
estate. There is also an existing Ohio statute which makes revocable trusts
"valid as to all persons" except creditors.'s It should be noted that no
exception was made for spouses. Furthermore, joint and survivorship bank
accounts' 9 and life insurance policies 20 have been upheld in Ohio against
the claims of the surviving spouse.
Conversely, it might be argued, particularly in those states where the
election statute operates in lieu of dower, that the statute, generally con-
sidered to be an enhancement of the rights of the surviving spouse rather
than a restriction, should protect the spouse against inter vivos transfers as
did common law dower in real property. Similarly, the growing tendency of
the legislatures and courts to award alimony and support to the wife in
divorce actions even though she is the party at fault2 ' may be considered a
manifestation of a public policy to preclude a spouse (women in particular)
from becoming a public charge.
The basic criticism of the fraud upon the marital rights test is that it
merely states a result, not the means of arriving at the result. It has also
been argued that in those states which set aside the transfer where there
is proof of intent to defraud the marital rights of the spouse but no
retention of control by the settlor, the courts are giving protection to the
spouse not contemplated even by those who give a liberal construction to
the election statutes. Such a rule is clearly in conflict with the policy of
free alienation of property. Moreover, where the transferor transfers with-
out an intent to defraud, the transfer is valid though almost complete control
over the property is retained. Therefore, under certain circumstances the
strict use of this test may produce undesirable results.
Perhaps the most just result can be obtained in cases of this nature by
using equitable tests which take cognizance of the extrinsic facts involved
instead of merely the intention of the transferor to defraud, his intention to
16 Bensing, "Inter Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse,"
42 Ky. L.J. 616, 623 (1954).
17 Goldman, "Rights of Spouse and Creditor in Inter Vivos Trusts," 17 U. Cinc.
L. Rev. 1 (1948).
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 1335.01 (1953).
'9 Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
20 Katz v. Ohio National Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531, 191 N.E. 782 (1934).
21 Ohio Rev. Code § 3105.18 (1953) has been interpreted as meaning that a
wife is entitled to alimony in certain circumstances even though the husband is awarded
the divorce decree. It appears that a "continuing support" theory is overshadowing
the notion of fault in Ohio alimony and divorce actions. De Milo v. Watson, 166 Ohio
St. 443, 133 N.E.2d 581 (1947); Gage v. Gage, 165 Ohio St. 452, 136 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
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divest himself completely of the property, or the mechanical test of the
Statute of Wills. It is believed that a needed flexibility can thus be obtained
in the result of the cases with less, or at least no more, confusion in the
reasons for reaching it. As indicated above, the fact that no other provision
has been made for the spouse would appear to be a legitimate reason for
setting aside the inter vivos transfer as to the spouse. 22 Conversely, where
the survivor has been reasonably provided for by other means, the transfer
should be held valid as to all parties involved. 23 Other facts to be taken
into consideration are whether the surviving spouse has funds of his own
on which he can draw whether the transferor was abandoned or otherwise
mistreated by the surviving spouse, whether the surviving spouse gave his
consent to the inter vivos transfer, and the actual needs of the surviving
spouse.2 4
It would appear that the outcome of the Smyth case was correct. How-
ever, the court's reasoning in arriving at its conclusion is not so clearly ex-
pressed as would be desirable. The court appears to have based its decision
on the finding that the trust was non-testamentary-applying its validity
under the Statute of Wills as a test. It also appears that considerable weight
was given to Ohio Revised Code section 1335.01 which states that revocable
trusts are "valid as to all" except creditors. The court proceeds, however,
and states that Smyth "advised his wife of his decision" that "she accompa-
nied him to the Cleveland Trust Company to make arrangements" that
the trust was created "five years before the settlor's death" and that "later
additions to the trust were made, in at least one of which the wife joined
in a conveyance of real estate which was conveyed to a trustee."2 5 From
this language it would appear that the test being applied is that of fraud
upon marital rights, and that since there was no fraud, the wife deserved
no elective share. However, the fact that the spouse was a beneficiary of
the trust and substantially provided for aside from the trust was noted.
This directs the conclusion that the equitable test was also used.
What criterion is the court advocating for the determination of whether
the surviving spouse is entitled to an elective share? The court has joined
the majority of jurisdictions not only in its decision on the effect of such
an inter vivos transfer, but also in its reluctance to lay down a precise
rule on the subject. As stated before, the result obtained in the instant
case was the only one tenable under any of the three mentioned tests. How-
ever, it would be most difficult to predict on the basis of the Smyth decision
what result would be reached in a case where, though the trust was non-
testamentary as evidenced by the intent of the settlor to divest himself of
title prior to death no provision was made for the spouse, and the circum-
stances presented the possibility of fraud upon his or her marital rights.
2 Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 552 (1944); Jaworski v. Wisiewski,
149 Md. 109, 131 Atl. 40 (1925).
23 Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942).
24 Sykes, "Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of Rights of Surviving Spouses," 10
Md. L. Rev. 1 (1949).
25 Smyth v. Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 502, 503 (1961).
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